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The Trojan Horse effect of urban
development has also been championed
as a solution to urban poverty by the
neoliberal economist Hernando de Soto.
De Soto’s argument is as simple as it
is deceptive: because the urban poor
typically do not have a ‘proper title’ to
their land or dwelling, these assets are
trapped as ‘dead capital’.5 The liberation
of this dead capital, then, requires
the formalisation of property rights
and material assets so as to enable
their potential value to be realised as
investment collateral. De Soto’s alleged
solution to the mystery of capital is thus
to introduce a more formidable and
uniform structure of financial debt by
homogenising the social relations of the
urban poor into formalised, accountable
proprietary assets against which money
for development can be borrowed.
Among the legions of critics who have
contested this logic, Mike Davis has
clearly described how this formalisation
of physical assets as property would
significantly disadvantage the poorest of
the informal settlements by forcing them
to compete within a formalised market
economy, and would therefore exacerbate
the most violent forms of urban poverty.
The question of adaptive capacities
with respect to architecture splits here
in two directions. First, it is necessary
to question the role of architecture as
the iconography of development; this
problematisation would certainly involve
a concerted, long-term effort, which
would itself require a fundamental
rethinking of architectural pedagogy
and apprenticeship, in addition to a
substantial reappraisal of the philosophy
of the city itself. Second, for architecture
to advance a more robust concept of the

city that could contest the developmental
violence of contemporary neoliberalism,
it is imperative to engage more fully
with the discourse of ‘informality’, since
it is this heterogeneous and difficultto-formalise series of social relations
that are so often the target of urban
development policy and its accumulation
through dispossession (again, frequently
under the dubious logic of correcting
urban ‘underdevelopment’).

I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective
practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations,
and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they
are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only
be understood through the other.
- Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, Power”

If we allow ourselves to conceive of
architecture as a practice that, in the
broad sense of the term, is opposed as
much to ‘the profession’, with its various
regulations and hierarchies, as it is
to ‘the discipline’, with its obsession
for self-replication and sycophantic
advancement, we open a space to
question architecture’s potential adaptive
capacity. Adaptation, as the active
realisation of an individual, community
or group’s adaptive capacity, can hereby
be understood less as an indexical
relation to changing conditions, and
more fundamentally as an ambition of
the practice as such. That is, adaptive
capacities are driven by challenging what
is assumed to be given in any situation.
Architecture, in this conception, is both
in and of the world, one with a rapidly
changing climate; indeed, how the
practice of architecture learns to adapt
among these changing climatic conditions
will determine its role in the various
political economic struggles pressurised
by our contemporary ecological and
metropolitan hypercomplexity. Were
the practice of architecture to assume
these climatic changes as given, instead
of conceiving of them as the aggregate
result of a multi-centered, multi-scaled
anthropogenic assemblage, it would
forfeit its adaptive capacity. Alternatively,
when the practice of architecture
unfolds its adaptive capacity in relation
to contemporary hypercomplexities,
several of its most cherished but least
examined conceptual alibis must be
challenged. To advance such a challenge,
we believe that Foucault’s assessment,
in the epigraph above, offers several
important points of departure. To develop
practices that explore the political

agency of other-than-affluent alliances –
practices committed to the full potential
of non-dominant political economic
realities – we see Foucault’s reframing
of the relationships among practices of
liberty, social relationships and spatial
distributions as fundamental to the work
of architecture.
In our research, it is necessary to
challenge the dominant alibi of
environmentalism in architecture, which,
having doubtlessly been addressed
across a wide number of projects
and practices for at least forty years,
nevertheless remains caught up within
a hierarchical, opaque and ultimately
illusory standard of sustainability
that is frequently connected to a form
of cultural elitism and well-intended
liberal gestures. Adapting the concept of
environmentalism in architecture practice
requires that the spatial distributions
implied by discourses on the environment
be assessed not only according to the
logic of inhabitation as performance and
occupancy as optimisation, but, more
fundamentally, in relation to temporalities
of violence. To provoke such an adaptive
rethinking, the activist writings of Rob
Nixon offer an uncompromising trajectory
of approach. To begin to account for the
often intangible effects of ‘slow violence’,
Nixon distinguishes this concept from
earlier theories of structural violence.1
In his words, ‘Structural violence is a
theory that entails rethinking different
notions of causation and agency with
respect to violent effects. Slow violence,
by contrast, might well include forms
of structural violence, but has a wider
descriptive range, calling attention
not simply to questions of agency, but

to broader, more complex categories
of violence enacted slowly over time.’2
Nixon goes on to connect this reading
of slow violence to the deep time of
geology and the evaluation, within
geologic and stratigraphic science, of
the Anthropocene thesis, although it
is equally connected to what might be
called the ‘attritional catastrophes’
brought about by climate change.3
This is not least because the slow but
relentless accumulation of violence
wrought by climate change, which is
characterised by unequal exposure to
risk and disproportionate pressures of
vulnerability, is inflicted most severely
on the urban poor. In this regard, we
agree with Nixon that ‘the fate of
environmentalism – and more decisively,
the character of the biosphere itself –
will be shaped significantly in decades
to come by the tension between what
Ramachandra Guha and Joan MartínezAlier have called “full-stomach” and
“empty-belly” environmentalism’.4
The question for architecture practice
and its potential adaptive capacities
is thus whether the ‘full-stomach’
environmentalism of eco-design and
liberal-minded sustainability can be
thought of as an adequate response to
the politics of hunger and thirst that are
made increasingly dire by the extreme
weather events, repeated resource
shortages and dramatic floods that shape
the lives of the urban poor in
the global south.
The spatial distribution of environmental
risks and benefits are also manifest in the
reality and potential of social relations.
In our research, the examination of such
relations within Jakarta begins with

a consideration of the contemporary
pressures for urban development. Of
course, this is by no means limited to
architectural discourse, even if the
iconic images of metropolitan progress
are so often delivered by contemporary
architecture firms. In this regard, the logic
of development is as malicious as it is
inescapable; development is a ubiquitous
concept that is readily accepted as a
natural given. Of this assumed given
condition, questions worth posing are:
Since when has development become the
goal of capitalist investment? And how
has this goal been articulated through its
opposing term, underdevelopment? What
began as early as 1949, with a speech
by then US president Harry Truman on
the need for affluent nations to address
the so-called underdevelopment of
less affluent states (notice how, in this
speech, the term development begins
to replace the term imperialism), has
grown into a global project of reducing
heterogeneous forms of social life to
potential economic resources. The
political dimension of development is
thus related to its tendency to reduce
the variegated social field to a more
coherent, recognisable and formal series
of designations that can be counted
and traded – that is, accumulated as
capital. The contemporary skyline of any
major megacity can thus be understood
as a series of inhabitable Trojan Horses
with designer shells, the occupants
of which enjoy the luxuries of highrise dwelling only as a residual effect,
while the primary effect of these major
developments is the accumulation of
profit by the development
firms themselves.

We are far from alone in attending to the
spatial distributions and social relations
at stake in informal settlements, even
if we prefer to use the somewhat more
awkward locution ‘difficult-to-formalise’
as a designation for the spaces and
relations in the kampungs of Jakarta.6
While recognizing the need to develop the
problem of informality more substantially,
presently it is valuable to note that the
prefix in- of the word informal operates
according to a logic similar to the prefix
under- in the term underdevelopment.
In both cases, the designation itself is
often sufficient to warrant some form
of concern or intervention on the part
of state authorities, financial investors,
or some motley aggregate of both.
What is occluded in such a missionary
approach to formalising the difficultto-formalise, and thus making possible
an accumulation of profit, is that
these social relations are themselves
already highly structured, organised
and coherent. They help distribute the
space of the kampung across ethnicities
and generations, affecting spatial
logics, temporal affinities, familial
connections, and modalities of relation
that are, quite simply, nonexchangeable.
In her recent essay ‘Informality and its
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Discontents’, Fran Tonkiss explains this
nonexchangeable or irreducible aspect of
difficult-to-formalise social relations in
the following terms:

Deferring for the moment the particular
subtleties of this discussion regarding
the autonomy of the urban poor, we can
still productively move on to examine the
discourse of autonomy as it has appeared
within the field of architecture.

process of accumulation, but a scientific
understanding of capitalism’s continuous
innovation, its incessant revolution of
production, consumption, and finance.
For Castoriadis, capitalism in this way
incarnated a new social imaginary,
predicated on the unlimited expansion
of rational mastery of the modes of
accumulation.’10 Aureli’s ‘project’ is
therefore an excavation of the concept
of political autonomy as it developed
in the writing of Mario Tronti and, more
broadly, in Italian Operaism (Workerism)
and Autonomism in the 1960s and 1970s.
Through this excavation, he demonstrates
a trajectory within the discourse of
autonomy typically excluded from
architecture altogether. More precisely,
for Aureli the project of autonomy that
leads from European Enlightenment
thinkers such as Immanuel Kant all the
way to the Italian Autonomia movement
is a project of reassembling the relation
between the imagined ‘autonomous’
subject and his rational, technological
determinism. For Aureli then, the
autonomy of politics – the irreducibility
of the political dimension of human
life – is, in fact, the permanent, ongoing
negotiation of the ‘subject’ as such. The
subject, whether conceptualised as
autonomous or structurally conditioned,
is thus the outcome of a process of
negotiation that is necessarily political.
Returning to the question of adaptation,
then, we can postulate the following
preliminary formulation: the imagined
autonomy of the European Enlightenment
subject, like the imagined autonomy of
architecture, is itself the outcome of
politics, not its precondition. From this
perspective, we assert that the autonomy
of architecture can only be conceived in

Economic strategies of self-help
frequently rely on social networks to
access resources, including credit,
information, land, physical capital,
protection, labor, or work opportunities.
The informal mobilization of social capital
allows people to find work, make space,
borrow money, stay safe, and acquire
goods in a way that would not be possible
if individuals had to rely on such formal
networks as credit unions, consumer and
labor markets, formal private and public
housing, and police and welfare systems.7
While we would tend to avoid the
discourse of social capital, our
inclination is to agree with Tonkiss’s
prescient assessment of the productive
heterogeneity of difficult-to-formalise
social relations. This is not least because
Tonkiss’s emphasis on the multiplicity of
meshwork relationships helps to remind
the architect that her most politically
potent actions could be those that help
defend the realities of heterogeneous
social relations, rather than replacing
them with the monotonous dead capital
of new superblocks that tend to scrape
away the settlements of the urban
poor long before they ever scrape the
sky. Still, it remains important to note
that the specificity of these complex,
heterogeneous social relations include
forms of violence and coercion that
cannot be easily dismissed; additionally,
the very conception of autonomy at stake
in readings of informal social relations
is also a matter of continuing debate.

As if caught in a perpetual refrain
between an illustrious past and
a condemned future, the concept
of autonomy within contemporary
discussions of architecture tends
to return to the reactionary claims
issued by architects in the mid- to late
twentieth century, which suggested the
social forces acting on the practice of
architecture were ultimately peripheral
and, ipso facto, negligible. Fortunately,
even within the discipline, this bad
infinity reiterating a reductive discourse
of autonomy has witnessed important
moments of contention, Pier Vittorio
Aureli’s recent book The Project of
Autonomy not least among them.8 Aureli
develops a reading of the Greek-French
philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis, who
closely examined the complex origins of
the idea of the autonomy of the subject
in relation to technological developments
in the European Enlightenment. Aureli
explains that, according to Castoriadis,
the period from the European
Enlightenment (1750) to the so-called
sunset of totalitarianism (1960) ‘was
characterized by the convergence of two
beliefs: in the autonomy of the subject,
and in the unlimited expansion of the
rationality implicit in technological
development. … [R]ationalism was a
mentality immediately appropriated and
forwarded by the expanding and totalizing
reach of capitalism.’9 Aureli continues:
‘Indeed, capitalism was not simply a
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terms of relations of power that make it
fundamentally social and political, and
therefore entirely imbricated in a multicentered, multi-scaled world within
which it must negotiate, and renegotiate,
its position as a practice of liberty. In
our view, autonomy is not the goal of
architecture, but the precondition for
the development of its adaptive capacity
within the world.
To more fully open up the three
conceptual backformations of autonomy,
development and environmentalism
to a more radical reconsideration, we
need to understand how architecture
operates within conditions of postnatural
hypercomplexity. Specifically, our
research considers those spaces in the
city of Jakarta where water dramatically
pressurises the relationships among
human actors, infrastructural systems,
and the various material agencies that
mediate both everyday life and emergency
situations. As architects, we examine
how water acts socially, politically,
and physically. In order to position the
potential agency of architecture in
Jakarta, it is worth staging the context of
the water politics central to the project
of Architecture + Adaptation. To do so, we
offer one especially compelling example
to demonstrate how water shapes the
practices of liberty, the social relations
and the distribution of space, all of
which, in their co-constitutive relations,
provoke the question of how architecture
practices can develop more lithe and
responsive adaptive capacities.
On 26 January 2013, major floods were
predicted for Jakarta. It was the height
of the rainy season and rainclouds were
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moving south toward the city, which had
already been inundated for most of the
month, with many areas operating in fits
and starts under the strain of enduring
flood conditions. The city governor
declared a state of emergency, and
100,000 people were evacuated from
their homes. The impending precipitation
happened to coincide with the rise of a
full moon, whose influence allows the
tides to reach their peak height, at which
point they tend to break the shoreline
and reach deep into the north end of the
city. In addition to these atmospheric and
cosmic forces, Jakarta’s location within
a shallow delta, which fills with water
during heavy rainfall due to the drainage
of the mountains to the south, further
exacerbated the state of emergency.
This geologic condition, expedited by
the impervious surfaces that constitute
the extensive urban footprint and thus
increase the flow of water into the city,
meant that on this day the water of
the banjir (flood) would come from all
directions at once.

declaring a state of emergency, and he
would do so again; this time, the Agency
for the Assessment and Application
of Technology (BPPT), who had been
‘waging a war’ against the rain, were
to use emergency measures to dump
salt, from ageing warplanes, into the
approaching storm clouds before they
reached the city. Salt, a desiccant, would
draw the moisture from the clouds and
cause it to rain over the ocean before
the precipitation hit the city. With this
proposal, the anticipation of banjir
connected the present emergency
to the mythical past as the power
of the governor was extended to the
atmosphere, whereby he would combat
the unholy alliance of atmospheric,
cosmic and geologic forces through a
fleet of airplanes indicating the modernity
of the Indonesian military.11

Firdaus Ali, a hydrological engineer from
the Universitas Indonesia, predicted
the worst floods of the year with an
announcement that resounded in the
media and struck a note of fearful
anticipation throughout the city.
According to Ali, the floods would likely
be worse than those of 2007, when
over 200,000 residents of Jakarta
were displaced. The recently elected
populist city governor, Joko Widodo,
tried to comfort the city with claims
that he could divert the rain before it
would reach the burdened and largely
dysfunctional canal system. He had
already taken extraordinary measures in

It did not rain on 26 January; it remains
unclear whether the salt bombs were
effective or whether other, less tangible
forces changed the rainclouds’ course.
However, on the verge of this banjir, the
typically unconsidered infrastructure of
the city – its obscure network of canals,
drainpipes and sewers, and all the small
pieces of city life that often lay unnoticed
and overlooked – was connected to the
cosmos. A sewer was suddenly connected
to the gravitational pull of the moon; a
canal was related by its proximity to the
geology of the nearby mountains; and
pipes that would have doubtlessly been
overwhelmed were potentially spared
through an act of atmospheric warfare.
The impending evacuation of residents
in the north was similarly linked to this
cosmological event. While inundation is
typical in the north, this time the water
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so persistently inundated other parts
of the city that it forced the experience
of banjir across a larger spatial territory
and broader social range, from the north
all the way down to the more affluent
southern and eastern edges of the city.
This new territory of experience suddenly
made the water politics of Jakarta, by
way of a vast and continued inundation,
sensible. This redistribution of the
sensible, then, connected the reality
of banjir to the urban poor as well as
the middle and professional classes,
challenging the modes of inhabitation
and settlement across classes and
income levels.

increasing speculative attention to
Indonesian markets, the question of
what kind of affinities, solidarities and
support structures can be developed
to prevent these economic trends from
simply reifying the division between
extravagant affluence and extreme
poverty must be asked now – and this
question must be asked by architects.13
Here, the work of the architect is also
part-translator, part-analyst, partnegotiator and part-intercessor who,
among the forces of financialisation as
urbanisation that efface capacities for
self-determination among the urban
poor, asserts her practice as decisively
political. Our contention is that the
future of hypercomplexity in Southeast
Asian megacities will witness either a
reification of political economic divisions
between the extremely affluent and the
neglected urban poor, or, as our research
platform attempts to do, begin to develop
new affinities between urban researchers,
architects, landscape architects and the
urban poor, to challenge the inequalities
of resource availability, unequal exposure
to environmental risks and benefits, and
urban health and wellbeing. Among the
various postnatural systems and social
relations pressurised by the slow violence
of climate change and the vicissitudes
of financial speculation, we offer these
matters of concern as areas
of consideration for other designers who
are likewise attempting to shape
their practice in such a way that allows
for a greater attention to, and interference
in, the conditions of everyday life among
urban struggles for self-determination,
mutual aid, and spatial and
environmental justice.
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the development of the World Bank–
funded ‘Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation
Project’, with its promise of delivering
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Jabodetabek, Indonesia; courtesy of David
Hutama.
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